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In his review of my book – Science as Social Existence: Heidegger and the Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge – Raphael Sassower objects that I do not address issues of market capitalism, 
democracy, and the ‘industrial-academic-military complex’ (Sassower 2018, 31). To this, I 
responded: ‘These are not what my book is about’ (Kochan 2018, 40). 
 
In a more recent review, Pablo Schyfter tries to turn this response around, and use it against 
me. Turnabout is fair play, I agree. Rebuffing my friendly, constructive criticism of the 
Edinburgh School’s celebrated and also often maligned ‘Strong Programme’ in the Sociology 
of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), Schyfter argues that I have failed to address what the 
Edinburgh School is actually about (Schyfter 2018, 9). 
 
Suppressing the Subject 
 
More specifically, Schyfter argues that I expect things from the Edinburgh School that they 
never intended to provide. For example, he takes what I call the ‘glass bulb’ model of 
subjectivity, characterises it as a ‘form of realism,’ and then argues that I have, in criticising 
the School’s lingering adherence to this model, failed to address their ‘actual intents’ 
(Schyfter 2018, 8, 9). According to Schyfter, the Edinburgh School did not have among its 
intentions the sorts of things I represent in the glass-bulb model – these are not, he says, 
what the School is about. 
 
This claim is clear enough. Yet, at the end of his review, Schyfter then muddies the waters. 
Rather than rejecting the efficacy of the glass-bulb model, as he had earlier, he now tries 
‘expanding’ on it, suggesting that the Strong Programme is better seen as a ‘working light 
bulb’: ‘It may employ a glass-bulb, but cannot be reduced to it’ (Schyfter 2018, 14). 
 
So is the glass-bulb model a legitimate resource for understanding the Edinburgh School, or 
is it not? Schyfter’s confused analysis leaves things uncertain. In any case, I agree with him 
that the Edinburgh School’s complete range of concerns cannot be reduced to those specific 
concerns I try to capture in the glass-bulb model. 
 
The glass-bulb model is a model of subjectivity, and subjectivity is a central topic of Science as 
Social Existence. It is remarkable, then, that the word ‘subject’ and its cognates never appear in 
Schyfter’s review (apart from in one quote from me). One may furthermore wonder why 
Schyfter characterises the glass-bulb model as a ‘form of realism.’ No doubt, these two 
topics – subjectivity and realism – are importantly connected, but they are not the same. 
Schyfter has mixed them up, and, in doing so, he has suppressed subjectivity as a topic of 
discussion. 
 
Different Kinds of Realism 
 
Schyfter argues that I am ‘unfair’ in criticising the Edinburgh School for failing to properly 
address the issue of realism, because, he claims, ‘[t]heir work was not about ontology’ 
(Schyfter 2018, 9). As evidence for my unfairness, he quotes my reference to ‘the problem of 
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how one can know that the external world exists’ (Schyfter 2018, 9; cf. Kochan 2017, 37). 
But the problem of how we can know something is not an ontological problem, it is an 
epistemological one, a problem of knowledge. Schyfter has mixed things up again. 
 
Two paragraphs later, Schyfter then admits that the Edinburgh School ‘did not entirely 
ignore ontology’ (Schyfter 2018, 9). I agree. In fact, as I demonstrate in Chapter One, the 
Edinburgh School was keen to ontologically ground the belief that the ‘external world’ 
exists. Why? Because they see this as a fundamental premise of science, including their own 
social science. 
 
I criticise this commitment to external-world realism, because it generates the 
epistemological problem of how one can know that the external world exists. And this 
epistemological problem, in turn, is vulnerable to sceptical attack. If the world is ‘external,’ 
the question will arise: external to what? The answer is: to the subject who seeks to know it. 
 
The glass-bulb model reflects this ontological schema. The subject is sealed inside the bulb; 
the world is external to the bulb. The epistemological problem then arises of how the subject 
penetrates the glass barrier, makes contact with – knows – the world. This problem is 
invariably vulnerable to sceptical attack. One can avoid the problem, and the attack, by fully 
jettisoning the glass-bulb model. Crucially, this is not a rejection of realism per se, but only of 
a particular form of realism, namely, external-world realism. 
 
Schyfter argues that the Edinburgh School accepts a basic premise, ‘held implicitly by people 
as they live their lives, that the world with which they interact exists’ (Schyfter 2018, 9). I 
agree; I accept it too. Yet he continues: ‘Kochan chastises this form of realism because it 
does not “establish the existence of the external world”’ (Schyfter 2018, 9). 
 
That is not quite right. I agree that people, as they live their lives, accept that the world 
exists. But this is not external-world realism, and it is the latter view that I oppose. I 
‘chastise’ the Edinburgh School for attempting to defend the latter view, when all they need 
to defend is the former. The everyday realist belief that the world exists is not vulnerable to 
sceptical attack, because it does not presuppose the glass-bulb model of subjectivity. 
 
On this point, then, my criticism of the Edinburgh School is both friendly and constructive. 
It assuages their worries about sceptical attack – which I carefully document in Chapter One 
– without requiring them to give up their realism. But the transaction entails that they 
abandon their lingering commitment to the glass-bulb model, including their belief in an 
‘external’ world, and instead adopt a phenomenological model of the subject as being-in-the-
world. 
 
Failed Diversionary Tactics 
 
It is important to note that the Edinburgh School does not reject scepticism outright. As 
long as the sceptic attacks absolutist knowledge of the external world, they are happy to go 
along. But once the sceptic argues that knowledge of the external world, as such, is 
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impossible, they demur, for this threatens their realism. Instead, they combine realism with 
relativism. Yet, as I argue, as long as they also combine their relativism with the glass-bulb 
model, that is, as long as theirs is an external-world realism, they will remain vulnerable to 
sceptical attack. 
 
Hence, I wrote that, in the context of their response to the external-world sceptic, the 
Edinburgh School’s distinction between absolute and relative knowledge ‘is somewhat 
beside the point’ (Kochan 2017, 48). In response, Schyfter criticises me for neglecting the 
importance of the Edinburgh School’s relativism (Schyfter 2018, 10). But I have done no 
such thing. In fact, I wholly endorse their relativism. I do suggest, however, that it be 
completely divorced from the troublesome vestiges of the glass-bulb model of subjectivity. 
 
Schyfter uses the same tactic in response to this further claim of mine: ‘For the purposes of 
the present analysis, whether [conceptual] content is best explained in collectivist or 
individualist terms is beside the point’ (Kochan 2017, 79). For this, I am accused of failing to 
recognise the importance of the Edinburgh School’s commitment to a collectivist or social 
conception of knowledge (Schyfter 2018, 11). 
 
The reader should not be deceived into thinking that the phrase ‘the present analysis’ refers 
to the book as a whole. In fact, it refers to that particular passage of Science as Social Existence 
wherein I discuss David Bloor’s claim that the subject can make ‘genuine reference to an 
external reality’ (Kochan 2017, 79; cf. Bloor 2001, 149). Bloor’s statement relies on the glass-
bulb model. Whether the subjectivity in the bulb is construed in individualist terms or in 
collectivist terms, the troubles caused by the model will remain. 
 
Hence, I cannot reasonably be charged with ignoring the importance of social knowledge for 
the Edinburgh School. Indeed, the previous but one sentence to the sentence on which 
Schyfter rests his case reads: ‘This sociological theory of the normativity and objectivity of 
conceptual content is a central pillar of SSK’ (Kochan 2017, 79). It is a central pillar of Science 
as Social Existence as well. 
 
Existential Grounds for Scientific Experience 
 
Let me shift now to Heidegger. Like previous critics of Heidegger, Schyfter is unhappy with 
Heidegger’s concept of the ‘mathematical projection of nature.’ Although I offer an 
extended defense and development of this concept, Schyfter nevertheless insists that it does 
‘not offer a clear explanation of what occurs in the lived world of scientific work’ (Schyfter 
2018, 11).  
 
For Heidegger, ‘projection’ structures the subject’s understanding at an existential level. It 
thus serves as a condition of possibility for both practical and theoretical experience. Within 
the scope of this projection, practical understanding may ‘change over’ to theoretical 
understanding. This change-over in experience occurs when a subject holds back from 
immersed, practical involvement with things, and instead comes to experience those things 
at a distance, as observed objects to which propositional statements may then be referred. 
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The kind of existential projection specific to modern science, Heidegger called 
‘mathematical.’ Within this mathematical projection, scientific understanding may likewise 
change over from practical immersion in a work-world (e.g., at a lab bench) to a theoretical, 
propositionally structured conception of that same world (e.g., in a lab report). 
 
What critics like Schyfter fail to recognise is that the mathematical projection explicitly 
envelopes ‘the lived world of scientific work’ and tries to explain it (necessarily but not 
sufficiently) in terms of the existential conditions structuring that experience. This is 
different from – but compatible with – an ethnographic description of scientific life, which 
need not attend to the subjective structures that enable that life.  
 
When such inattention is elevated to a methodological virtue, however, scientific subjectivity 
will be excluded from analysis. As we will see in a moment, this exclusion is manifest, on the 
sociology side, in the rejection of the Edinburgh School’s core principle of 
underdetermination. 
 
In the mid-1930s, Heidegger expanded on his existential conception of science, introducing 
the term mathēsis in a discussion of the Scientific Revolution. Mathēsis has two features: 
metaphysical projection; and work experiences. These are reciprocally related, always 
occurring together in scientific activity. I view this as a reciprocal relation between the 
empirical and the metaphysical, between the practical and the theoretical, a reciprocal 
relation enabled, in necessary part, by the existential conditions of scientific subjectivity. 
 
Schyfter criticises my claim that, for Heidegger, the Scientific Revolution was not about a 
sudden interest in facts, measurement, or experiment, where no such interest had previously 
existed. For him, this is ‘excessively broad,’ ‘does not reflect the workings of scientific 
practice,’ and is ‘belittling of empirical study’ (Schyfter 2018, 12). This might be true if 
Heidegger had offered a theory-centred account of science. But he did not. Heidegger 
argued that what was decisive in the Scientific Revolution was, as I put it, ‘not that facts, 
experiments, calculation and measurement are deployed, but how and to what end they are 
deployed’ (Kochan 2017, 233). 
 
According to Heidegger, in the 17th c. the reciprocal relation between metaphysical 
projection and work experience was mathematicised. As the projection became more 
narrowly specified – i.e., axiomatised – the manner in which things were experienced and 
worked with also became narrower. In turn, the more accustomed subjects became to 
experiencing and working with things within this mathematical frame, the more resolutely 
mathematical the projection became. Mathēsis is a kind of positive feedback loop at the 
existential level. 
 
Giving Heidegger Empirical Feet 
 
This is all very abstract. That is why I suggested that ‘[a]dditional material from the history of 
science will allow us to develop and refine Heidegger’s account of modern science in a way 
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which he did not’ (Kochan 2017, 235). This empirical refinement and development takes up 
almost all of Chapters 5 and 6, wherein I consider: studies of diagnostic method by 
Renaissance physician-professors at the University of Padua, up until their appointment of 
Galileo in 1591; the influence of artisanal and mercantile culture on the development of 
early-modern scientific methods, with a focus on metallurgy; and the dispute between Robert 
Boyle and Francis Line in the mid-17th c. over the experimentally based explanation of 
suction. 
 
As Paolo Palladino recognises in his review of Science as Social Existence, this last empirical 
case study offers a different account of events than was given by Steven Shapin and Simon 
Schaffer in their classic 1985 book Leviathan and the Air-Pump, which influentially applied 
Edinburgh School methods to the history of science (Palladino 2018, 42). I demonstrate that 
Heidegger’s account is compatible with this sociological account, and that it also offers 
different concepts leading to a new interpretation. 
 
Finally, at the end of Chapter 6, I demonstrate the compatibility of Heidegger’s account of 
modern science with Bloor’s concept of ‘social imagery,’ not just further developing and 
refining Heidegger’s account of modern science, but also helping to more precisely define 
the scope of application of Bloor’s valuable methodological concept. Perhaps this does not 
amount to very much in the big picture, but it is surely more than a mere ‘semantic 
reformulation of Heidegger’s ideas,’ as Schyfter suggests (Schyfter 2018, 13). 
 
Given all of this, I am left a bit baffled by Schyfter’s claims that I ‘belittle’ empirical 
methods, that I ‘do[] not present any analysis of SSK methodologies,’ and that I am guilty of 
‘a general disregard for scientific practice’ (Schyfter 2018, 12, 11). 
 
Saving an Edinburgh School Method 
 
Let me pursue the point with another example. A key methodological claim of the 
Edinburgh School is that scientific theory is underdetermined by empirical data. In order to 
properly explain theory, one must recognise that empirical observation is an interpretative 
act, necessarily (but not sufficiently) guided by social norms. 
 
I discuss this in Chapter 3, in the context of Bloor’s and Bruno Latour’s debate over another 
empirical case study from the history of science, the contradictory interpretations given by 
Robert Millikan and Felix Ehrenhaft of the natural phenomena we now call ‘electrons.’ 
 
According to Bloor, because Millikan and Ehrenhaft both observed the same natural 
phenomena, the divergence between their respective claims – that electrons do and do not 
exist – must be explained by reference to something more than those phenomena. This 
‘something more’ is the divergence in the respective social conditions guiding Millikan and 
Ehrenhaft’s interpretations of the data (Kochan 2017, 124-5; see also Kochan 2010, 130-33). 
Electron theory is underdetermined by the raw data of experience. Social phenomena, or 
‘social imagery,’ must also play a role in any explanation of how the controversy was settled. 
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Latour rejects underdetermination as ‘absurd’ (Kochan 2017, 126). This is part of his more 
general dismissal of the Edinburgh School, based on his exploitation of vulnerabilities in 
their lingering adherence to the glass-bulb model of subjectivity. I suggest that the 
Edinburgh School, by fully replacing the glass-bulb model with Heidegger’s model of the 
subject as being-in-the-world, can deflect Latour’s challenge, thus saving underdetermination 
as a methodological tool. 
 
This would also allow the Edinburgh School to preserve subjectivity as a methodological 
resource for sociological explanation. Like Heidegger’s metaphysical projection, the 
Edinburgh School’s social imagery plays a necessary (but not a sufficient) role in guiding the 
subject’s interpretation of natural phenomena. 
 
The ‘Tradition’ of SSK – Open or Closed? 
 
Earlier, I mentioned the curious fact that Schyfter never uses the word ‘subject’ or its 
cognates. It is also curious that he neglects my discussion of the Bloor-Latour debate and 
never mentions underdetermination. In Chapter 7 of Science as Social Existence, I argue that 
Latour, in his attack on the Edinburgh School, seeks to suppress subjectivity as a topic for 
sociological analysis (Kochan 2017, 353-54, and, for methodological implications, 379-80; 
see also Kochan 2015).  
 
More recently, in my response to Sassower, I noted the ongoing neglect of the history of 
disciplinary contestation within the field of science studies (Kochan 2018, 40). I believe that 
the present exchange with Schyfter nicely exemplifies that internal contestation, and I thank 
him for helping me to more fully demonstrate the point. 
 
Let me tally up. Schyfter is silent on the topic of subjectivity. He is silent on the Bloor-
Latour debate. He is silent on the methodological importance of underdetermination. And 
he tries to divert attention from his silence with specious accusations that, in Science as Social 
Existence, I belittle empirical research, that I disregard scientific practice, that I fail to 
recognise the importance of social accounts of knowledge, and that I generally do not take 
seriously Edinburgh School methodology. 
 
Schyfter is eager to exclude me from what he calls the ‘tradition’ of SSK (Schyfter 2018, 13). 
He seems to view tradition as a cleanly bounded and internally cohesive set of ideas and 
doings. By contrast, in Science as Social Existence, I treat tradition as a historically fluid range of 
intersubjectively sustained existential possibilities, some inevitably vying against others for a 
place of cultural prominence (Kochan 2017, 156, 204f, 223, 370f). Within this ambiguously 
bounded and inherently fricative picture, I can count Schyfter as a member of my tradition. 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
My thanks to David Bloor and Martin Kusch for sharing with me their thoughts on 
Schyfter’s review. The views expressed here are my own. 
 
  
 21 
Vol. 7, no. 12 (2018): 15-21  
https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-44s 
Contact details: jwkochan@gmail.com 
 
References 
 
Bloor, David (2001). ‘What Is a Social Construct?’ Facta Philosophica 3: 141-56. 
Kochan, Jeff (2018). ‘On the Sociology of Subjectivity: A Reply to Raphael Sassower.’ Social 
Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7(5): 39-41. https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3Xm 
Kochan, Jeff (2017). Science as Social Existence: Heidegger and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
(Cambridge: Open Book Publishers). http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0129 
Kochan, Jeff (2015). ‘Putting a Spin on Circulating Reference, or How to Rediscover the 
Scientific Subject.’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 49:103-107. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.10.004 
Kochan, Jeff (2010). ‘Contrastive Explanation and the “Strong Programme” in the Sociology 
of Scientific Knowledge.’ Social Studies of Science 40(1): 127-44. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312709104780  
Palladino, Paolo (2018). ‘Heidegger Today: On Jeff Kochan’s Science and Social Existence.’ 
Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7(8): 41-46. 
Sassower, Raphael (2018). ‘Heidegger and the Sociologists: A Forced Marriage?’ Social 
Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7(5): 30-32. 
Schyfter, Pablo (2018). ‘Inaccurate Ambitions and Missing Methodologies: Thoughts on Jeff 
Kochan and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.’ Social Epistemology Review and 
Reply Collective 7(8): 8-14. 
Shapin, Steven and Simon Schaffer (1985). Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the 
Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
